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Th e ﬁ rst thing that individuals in the ﬁ eld of deception detection notice upon 
observing fMRI research conducted in a lab is how very diﬀ erent the experi-
ence is to the real world. In a typical fMRI experiment, a participant will lie 
in a scanner while performing a particular task (Figure 1).
In the earliest fMRI studies, participants watched patterns of grids, such as 
checkerboards, while scientists measured the output from the visual cortex. 
First, an MRI image is taken of the individual’s brain which, like a ﬁ ngerprint, 
has its own unique shape and size. Later, the voxels containing signiﬁ cant 
relative brain activity are overlaid on this image.
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Figure 1: Participant resting on the table of an MRI, coils are placed around the head to meas-
ure the MRI signal. In a simple analogy, a camera captures the intensity and color of light to 
create an image. In an MRI, we use radio waves to excite the molecules in the brain and as the 
molecules return to rest, the released energy is captured by the MRI coils. Like the intensity 
and colors in a camera image, the energy from the various molecules in the brain show up with 
diﬀ erent intensities and contrasts (i.e. colors), creating an image.
Next, a series of low-resolution scans are recorded over time, some during 
one condition and others during a diﬀ erent condition (see Figure 2). For ex-
ample, some scans might be taken while an individual is telling a lie, while 
others might be taken while an individual is telling the truth. Th e two sets of 
scans are later compared to see which areas are more active. When a human-
being engages in a cognitive activity, such as subtraction, reading, or lying, 
various parts of the brain become active. Increased mental activity is associ-
ated with increased metabolic activity, and that metabolic activity results in 
an increase in blood ﬂ ow to the area. Th e diﬀ erence in blood ﬂ ow between 
conditions is called “relative activity”. For example, in order to compare rela-
tive activity between lie telling and truth telling, we compare the blood ﬂ ow 
measured when a participant tells a lie to the blood ﬂ ow measured when the 
same participant tells the truth. 
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Figure 2. Th e ﬁ rst row depicts a complete T1 weighted scan. In the second row, the brain region 
has been extracted (BET) from the original scan. T1 weighted scans, a type of structural MRI, 
are designed to give the best possible picture of the brain’s gray matter (see breakout). Th e third 
row shows one volume from a multivolume fMRI scan. Functional scans are made at much 
lower resolution than structural scans because time is a factor. Unlike a sMRI which can take as 
long as 12 minutes, an fMRI volume is measured in around 2–3 seconds. A second diﬀ erence is 
that the functional BOLD scan is designed to measure blood oxygen.
Anyone who studies or practices in the ﬁ eld of deception detection will be 
familiar with this conundrum: How do we determine what a lie is? Th e fMRI 
oﬀ ers no solution to the problem. An informal consensus among researchers 
is that the act of deception is not a unique cortical process, but the summa-
tion of many (some interchangeable) processes in the brain. For the purpose 
of discussing the how these processes might work, I have proposed a simple 
framework of the order of cognitive processes that occur when an individual 
hears a question and then responds deceptively (Figure 3). 
Every person has a normal resting state, and pattern of physiological reactiv-
ity that is unique. Diverse factors such as physical health, emotional state, 
drug use, intelligence, and familial support systems all help to shape resting 
executive control. If a question is asked to which the person intends to lie, 
attention is directed to the question and cognitive resources are allocated. In 
addition, information is recalled that relates to the question as well as social 
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decision making information. A decision is made to inhibit the truthful in-
formation and present the deceptive information. Th ere is strong evidence 
that these processes are happening in parallel. For example, it is not always 
necessary to fully retrieve information from long-term memory before de-
ciding to inhibit it and respond deceptively.
Figure 3. A cognitive framework for organizing studies of the processes involved in deception.
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As any examiner will note, the polygraph is not a tool for detecting decep-
tion, per se. Th e polygraph is a tool for measuring physiological responses. 
In the same way, a fMRI scan does not measure the brain activity unique to 
deception. While there is no one region of the brain that is directly associ-
ated with deception, there does seem to be a core set of cognitive processes 
that are associated with the processes involved in lie-telling. However, these 
processes are also associated with two levels of diﬃ  culty. Similar to the con-
struction of a polygraph examination, a fMRI test must be constructed with 
attention to detail. 
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Th ree papers have reviewed the data from fMRI studies of deception (Bhatt 
et al., 2009; Christ et al., 2009; Vendemia et al., 2009). Before discussing the 
studies, a quick note about anatomical names (see Figure 4). Neuroscientists 
have diﬀ erent preferences for naming cortical anatomy. Th e ﬁ eld is in a pe-
riod of rapid growth, and we are learning previously unknown information 
about the brain. Naming conventions will continue to change as the breadth 
of our knowledge expands and our ability to map the brain improves. Some 
researchers have a preference for using Brodmann’s Areas which represent 
numbered regions of the brain divided by the type of neurons in the region 
and their interconnections. Other researchers prefer a strictly anatomical 
name which is based soley on the structures of the brain. Th e third group 
has developed a merging of these naming systems to best represent what we 
know of the function of the underlying cortex. If you read literature about 
deception, you will most like see the structures in Figure 4.
Each of the reviews have focussed on the major studies in the ﬁ eld, and come 
to similar conclusions. Th e paradigms included modifed versions of the 
guilty knowledge task, lying about recently acquired knowledge, prepared 
or spontaneous lyies about past experiences, and lies about recent actions. 
Christ identiﬁ ed regional brain activity common across the studies in a meta-
analysis, and then compared them to areas of the brain associated with three 
cognitive processes: 1) working memory, 2) inhibitory control, and 3) task 
switching. Th ese three processes are most consistently reported through-
out the deception literature and are supported by measures of reaction time, 
pupilommetry, galvanic skin response, and brain wave recordings obtained 
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through event-related potentials (ERP). However, for reasons I will explain 
later the meta-analytic approach is not ideal with the research that has been 
conducted thus far.
In block design fMRI studies of deception, researchers have associated activa-
tions in the caudate (Lee et al., 2002), cerebellum (Ganis et al., 2003), cingu-
late (Mohamed, Faro, Gordon, Platek, Ahmad, & Williams, 2006; Ganis et al., 
2003; Kozel et al., 2004; Lee et al., 2002), cuneus (Ganis et al., 2003), fusiform/
parahippocampal area (Ganis et al., 2003; Kozel et al., 2004), precental gyrus 
(Ganis et al., 2003), ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (Mohamed et al., 2006; 
Spence et al., 2001), medial prefrontal cortex (Ganis et al., 2003; Langleben et 
al., 2002; Spence et al., 2001), prefrontal cortex (Mohamed et al., 2006; Ganis 
et al., 2003; Kozel et al., 2004; Lee et al., 2002), left frontal (Ganis et al., 2003; 
Langleben et al., 2002; Spence et al., 2001), left inferior parietal (Langleben et 
al., 2002), (Lee et al., 2002; Spence et al., 2001), and temporal, (Mohamed et 
al., 2006; Kozel et al., 2004; Lee et al., 2002; Stelmack, Houlihan, Doucet, & 
Belisle, 1994b) regions with the act of deception. 
Table 1 lists fMRI studies in which participants engaged in deceptive behavior 
or observed deceptive behavior, and the speciﬁ cs of each paradigm. It is clear 
that these studies diﬀ er on how participants were “motivated” to deceive, the 
types of lies they were asked to tell, the type information about which they 
lied, and the type of polygraph scenario they attempted to parallel.
Table 1. A comparison of paradigms investigating deception
Author Paradigm Description Lie Type
Bhatt et al., 
2009
Participants responded to grayscale images of faces 
presented in lineups
Facial recogni-
tion
Ganis et al., 
2003 
Recorded work/vacation scenarios, after 1-week 
delay generated alternate scenarios and memorized 
them.
Memorized and 
Spontaneous
German et 
al., 2004
Observers indicated whether real or acted clips re-
vealed completed acts. Observation only
Grezes et 
al., 2004
Observers indicated whether actors actually lifted 
heavy boxes or pretended to lift heavy boxes. Observation only
Kozel et al., 
2004a
For a reward, participants lied and told the truth 
regarding objects under which $50 was hidden.
Concealed infor-
mation 
Kozel et al., 
2004b
For a reward, participants, lied and told the truth 
regarding an object under which $50 was hidden.
Concealed infor-
mation
Kozel et al., 
2005
For a reward, participants, lied and told the truth 
regarding an object under which $50 was hidden.
Concealed infor-
mation
Langleben 
et a., 2002 Deception to cards in a concealed information test
Concealed infor-
mation
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Langleben 
et al., 2005
For a reward participants were instructed to (lie) 
deny possession of one playing card and (truth) 
acknowledge the possession of a diﬀ erent playing 
card.
Directed lie 
about objects in 
possession
Lee et al., 
2002 
For a reward, participants lied in a card playing sce-
nario
Concealed infor-
mation
Lee et al, 
2002
For an imaginary reward, participants faked amne-
sia to digits and autobiographical information
Simulated am-
nesia digits and 
autobiographic 
memory
Mohamed 
et al., 2006
Participants responded to previously recorded 
questions in a concealed information test
Nunez et 
al., 2005
Subjects instructed to give truthful or „false” an-
swers (blocked) to a series of yes/no questions that 
also varied in autobiographical content
Autobiographi-
cal Memory
Phan et al., 
2005
For a reward, participants lied in a card playing sce-
nario
Concealed infor-
mation
Spence et 
al., 2005
Participants were told to lie and tell the truth to 
events that happened earlier in the day
Directed lie to 
episodic memory
Spence et 
al., 2001 
Participants were told to lie and tell the truth to 
events that happened earlier in the day
Directed lie to 
episodic memory
Even given these diﬀ erences, activations in certain regions could be anticipat-
ed based on the underlying processes engaged in each study. For example, the 
studies by Kozel et al. (2004, 2004b, 2005), Langleben et al. (2002), and Phan 
et al. (2005) each used a risk-taking scenario in which participants would re-
ceive a monetary reward if they “fooled” the examiner, but no reward if they 
failed to “fool” the examiner. Given this condition, activation could be antici-
pated in the orbitofrontal cortex, a region of the frontal cortex that has been 
implicated in the integration of motivational stimuli when guiding response 
selection (Schoenbaum, Takahashi, Liu, & McDannald, 2011). Only Kozel 
identiﬁ ed activation in this region.
John Gabrieli and other fMRI researchers argue that the anterior prefrontal 
cortex, or Brodmann’s Area 10, is involved in the act of deception (Gabrieli, 
July 14, 2005). Ramnani and Owen (2004) argue that this area is activated 
when an individual must make simultaneous considerations of multiple rela-
tions. When an individual deceives, these multiple relations may occur be-
tween situational context, goal-driven behavior, divergence of the deceptive 
information from truthful information, and a variety of internal states. Given 
the generalist nature of these “simultaneous considerations,” it is no surprise 
that several researchers have identiﬁ ed activation in this region during the 
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act of deception (Bhatt et al., 2009; Ganis et al., 2003; Lee et al., 2002; Mo-
hamed et al., 2006; Vendemia, & Buzan, 2004a; ).
However, the most widely reported region of activation is the anterior cin-
gulate (Vendemia, & Buzan, 2004b; Spence et al., 2001). Th is activation is 
broken down into two main areas, the ventral anterior cingulate and the dor-
sal anterior cingulate. Some researchers believe that this area is involved in 
conﬂ ict resolution, while others believe that it is involved in attention shifting 
and resource allocation processes. It is possible that the more ventral regions 
are involved in conﬂ ict resolution, while the more dorsal area is involved in 
attention shifting. It is theoretically probable that the act of deception in-
volves both processes.
Bhatt’s (2009) review of the brain regions activated in fMRI studies noted 
that the group activations reported in the studies were quite varied (activa-
tion between truthful groups and deceptive groups). Vendemia et al., (2009) 
evaluated the intersubject variability between the studies ﬁ nding that the 
general diﬀ erences in brain activation between participants was greater than 
that between truthful and deceptive responding. At ﬁ rst the variability seems 
overwhelming, but this variability is exactly what research with the fMRI is 
designed to identify. 
Th e polygraph is a reliable measure of autonomic nervous system responses, 
and it is very robust. Any variety of test formats produce similar results, even 
though the formats measure diﬀ erent aspects of cognition, attention, and 
emotion. Th e reason the tests are robust is that autonomic system responses 
result from the combination of cognitive processes. Very similar patterns of 
results can be the results of diﬀ erent combinations of cognitive processes. 
For example, the guilty knowledge (“concealed information”) test depends 
on the presentation of the infrequent “relevant” item among high frequency 
irrelevant items. Extensive research with the infrequent/frequent paradigm 
with other measures of cortical activity suggest that “the expectation of the 
infrequent stimulus” drives the autonomic system activity. When the an-
ticipated infrequent stimulus occurs and the rare information is recognized 
a particular brainwave, the oddball P300, occurs (Allen & Iacono, 1997; Allen 
et al., 1992; Farwell & Donchin, 1991; Rosenfeld et al., 1999). Particular cog-
nitive functions associated with the identiﬁ cation of the infrequent stimulus 
include attention resource allocation (Comerchero & Polich, 1999), and the 
consequential updating of information held in working memory (Donchin & 
Coles, 1988; Ruchkin et al., 1990).
During probable lie format exams, in which relevant questions are embed-
ded in between pairs of “probably lie” questions that are then intermingled 
with irrelevant questions, waveforms associated with recall of information 
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(N4) and switching between high and low diﬃ  culty conditions occur (Meek, 
Phillips, Boswell, & Vendemia, 2013; Schillaci & Vendemia, 2014; Vendemia, 
Schillaci, Buzan, Green, & Meek, 2009). 
Using fMRI, along with other technologies and techniques, we can begin 
to parcel the speciﬁ c cortical activity that occurs during the act of decep-
tion. Th e task is far from simple, and the studies conducted thus far are rife 
with errors in test construction. Th ey repeat errors that occurred in the early 
1990’s with the ﬁ rst studies of brain wave measures of deception which re-
peated errors in the ﬁ rst designs of polygraph tests. In addition to errors in 
design, fMRI tests are susceptible to a variety of errors.
????????? ?????????????????????????????
Noise related to people. Within subject noise can occur any time a subject 
moves inside the MRI scanner. Respiratory and cardiac artifacts can also cre-
ate within subject noise during scans, as can attentional modulation, changes 
in cognitive strategy, drugs and medications, anxiety, and countermeasures. 
Factors related to within subject noise are also consistently present in be-
tween subject noise. Whenever a diﬀ erence occurs between participants that 
is not related to the task, it enters into a class of error called between sub-
ject noise. Variability in how the brain’s anatomy, diﬀ erences in hemoglobin 
concentrations, cytoarchitectonic variability (how the diﬀ erent parts of the 
brain are connected during development), and variability in venous drainage 
patterns are all factors of between subjects noise. Other factors such as how 
much information a person can maintain at any given moment in time, work-
ing memory, are also considered between subject noise if the experimenter 
has not considered them. 
An example of the impact of such a variable can be observed in a study in 
which we tested the verbal memory in 19 participants who then performed 
a deception task in the fMRI.
All were scans collected at 3T with Siemens Magnetom Trio System using 
T2* weighted echoplanar images sensitive to blood oxygen levels were ac-
quired during the functional scans (gradient echo; TR = 2490 ms; TE = 30 
ms; image matrix = 64 X 64; in-plane resolution = 208 X 208 mm; slice thick-
ness = 3.2 mm). Voxel-wise analysis was carried out using ﬂ exible hemo-
dynamic response function (HRF) modeling, allowing HRF to vary spatially 
and between subjects. (Woolrich 2004). Analysis was carried out using FEAT 
(FMRI Expert Analysis Tool) Version 5.63, part of FSL (FMRIB’s Software 
Library, www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl). Time-series statistical analysis was car-
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ried out using FILM with local autocorrelation correction (Woolrich 2001). 
Z (Gaussianised T/F) statistic images were thresholded using clusters deter-
mined by Z>2.3 and a (corrected) cluster signiﬁ cance threshold of P=0.05 
(Worsley 1992). Registration to high resolution and/or standard images was 
carried out using FLIRT (Jenkinson 2001, 2002).
Participants with lower scores on verbal working memory had greater rela-
tive activation in the left middle frontal gyrus while responding deceptively 
than those with higher scores (Figure 5). Th e ﬁ nding is critical as the left 
middle frontal gyrus is a common ﬁ nding in fMRI studies of deception. If 
participants who have poor working memory skills show greater activation 
in deception relative to truth telling than any study that reports left frontal 
middle activation without accounting for the eﬀ ect verbal working memory 
is potentially confounded. 
Figure 5. Greater relative left middle frontal gyrus activation in participants with lower working 
memory scores than those with higher working memory scores when they respond deceptively 
as compared to truthfully.
Paradigm Noise. Issues with between paradigm noise arise from inconsist-
ent deﬁ nitions of types of deception being used in paradigms, diﬀ erences in 
stimuli presented (rate, number, and type), diﬀ erences in the type of memory 
involved, and diﬀ erences in reward/punishment scenarios. We studied a very 
simple aspect of stimulus presentation in the fMRI by having participants 
respond deceptively on diﬀ erent percentages of the trials.
Participants were 89 undergraduate college students (61 females, Mean age 
= 20.9 yrs, SD = 3.45). Ethnicity breakdown : 78% Caucasian, 8% African-
American, 3% Asian, 2% Hispanic, 3% identiﬁ ed as Other, 5% did not re-
port. An event-related paradigm was implemented with 200 trials of the two-
stimulus type being presented. Participants were randomly assigned to one 
of three conditions, 20% Lie (N = 15), 50% Lie (N = 21), or 80% Lie (N=21). 
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Th ese N’s represent the ﬁ nal numbers, as participants were thrown out for 
too much motion or accuracies below 85% before analyses. 
As can be seen in Figure 6 relative activity in the anterior cingulate and pari-
etal cortex was signiﬁ cantly greater when participants responded on 50% of 
the trials as compared to 20% of the trials. Activity in the anterior cingulate 
is the primary ﬁ nding in fMRI studies of deception. Th e eﬀ ect of this small 
paradigm manipulation has crucial implications. First, it is critical to know 
what is the mechanism causes anterior cingulate action. Second researchers 
must be clear about how frequently participants told lies; of the previous re-
search studies reviewed for this paper several did not contain enough infor-
mation to determine how often their participants told lies. Of those papers in 
which the information was available the participants were deceptive on 10% 
to 80% of trials. 
Figure 6. Patterns of relative brain activation when participants respond deceptively as com-
pared to truthfully. In the top panel, participants responded deceptively on 20% of the trials. In 
the second panel participants responded deceptively on 50% of the trials. Th e bottom panels 
shows the speciﬁ c regions that were activated more in the 50% condition than in the 20% condi-
tion.
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Validity of Stimuli. Deception paradigms are based on the assumption that 
the only diﬀ erence between stimulation “questions” is the participant’s truth-
ful, deceptive, or unknown response. A substantial body of scientiﬁ c evi-
dence points to several confounding factors within the question set designs 
of existing paradigms (Phillips, Meek, & Vendemia, 2011). Unfortunately, 
a systematic approach to question design based on known linguistic and cog-
nitive principles has not been developed (Phillips & Vendemia, 2008). Th e 
validity of test stimuli should be investigated thoroughly by basic research-
ers, rather than applied researchers, and then tested for generalizability and 
disseminated to the ﬁ eld.
Analytical Assumptions. fMRI is a multivariate signal which means that the 
brain functions as a system with diﬀ erent areas of activation being interde-
pendent on one another. Th e problem of multivariate signal detection can be 
easily resolved by requiring that researchers utilize multivariate approaches 
for data analysis or reduction. In some cases a univariate approach can be 
justiﬁ ed, and for those, researchers should be able to provide such justiﬁ ca-
tion. All levels of research, from basic validity testing to ﬁ eld testing, should 
meet this criterion.
Methodological Confounds. Researchers should be familiarized with the 
literature of deception before they begin constructing paradigms. Methodo-
logical confounds can enter the test scenario at any level of research or ﬁ eld 
design. A mechanism should be put into place to allow feedback between 
basic and applied researchers to communicate possible sources of confounds. 
In addition, a mechanism should be put into place that allows ﬁ eld examiners 
to communicate to appropriate applied researchers when the ﬁ eld applica-
tions provide unexpected results. 
Unity of Construct Assumption. A basic research program that focuses on 
the identiﬁ cation of models of deception and of underlying dimensions of 
deception should exist. Th is program is a fundamental part of establishing 
the validity of the measures.
Construct Validity. An ongoing basic research program that focuses on the 
identiﬁ cation of a valid model of deceptive behavior at the central nervous 
system should exist. If a valid model can be identiﬁ ed with central nervous 
system measures, then test designs can be formulated based on those meas-
ures and translated to other sensor systems for experimental testing. 
????????? ???????????????
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fMRI has the potential for yielding the most speciﬁ c measures of deceptive 
behaviors of any technology; however, that potential is signiﬁ cantly ham-
pered by a lack of speciﬁ city in the current research applications. A major 
problem with the current set of research protocols is that researchers are 
often guided by unidimensional theoretical assumptions, without any con-
sideration of confounding factors. Th is is particularly problematic because 
the reported studies are highly confounded by variables known to aﬀ ect pe-
ripheral system measures (and therefore CNS measures as well). 
Researchers need to be familiar with neuroscientiﬁ c processes in the human 
brain to conduct adequate studies with this technology. Of critical impor-
tance is a familiarity with those processes known to aﬀ ect other dependent 
measures of deception. Test construction within this arena is of paramount 
importance. Researchers need to have experience with the broad set of re-
sults and techniques in the ﬁ eld of credibility assessment, and to revisit ques-
tions many times before reaching conclusions.
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